<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?><feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" ><generator uri="https://jekyllrb.com/" version="3.10.0">Jekyll</generator><link href="https://blog.dmsgn.dev/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" /><link href="https://blog.dmsgn.dev/" rel="alternate" type="text/html" /><updated>2026-11-09T15:51:17+00:00</updated><id>https://blog.dmsgn.dev/feed.xml</id><title type="html">Agentic journey</title><subtitle>A non-programmer building real products with Claude and Codex. Experiments, results and missteps, written up as they happen.</subtitle><entry><title type="html">The 6%</title><link href="https://blog.dmsgn.dev/2026/10/the-6-percent/" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="The 6%" /><published>2026-10-31T00:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2026-10-31T00:00:00+00:00</updated><id>https://blog.dmsgn.dev/2026/10/the-6-percent</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://blog.dmsgn.dev/2026/10/the-6-percent/"><![CDATA[<p><strong>Where AI coding value actually lands, and why most of it never reaches the P&amp;L</strong></p>

<p>McKinsey surveyed 1,719 executives across 97 countries this spring. Eighty percent of those who use AI in their own work say it made them more productive. Sixty-three percent of their organisations report no measurable earnings impact at all. Six percent attribute 5% or more of EBIT to AI.</p>

<p>Both halves are true. The gap between them is the whole subject.</p>

<p>I have spent the past year building with agentic coding tools — orchestrating parallel sessions, running rebuild benchmarks, and modelling the second- and third-order effects on employment. The individual gain is not in question. What I keep finding is that the gain gets absorbed before it reaches the P&amp;L, and that the absorption is structural rather than a tooling problem.</p>

<h2 id="what-is-actually-scaling">What is actually scaling</h2>

<p>Not coding speed. The measure worth watching is how long a task an agent can finish end to end. METR’s benchmark puts the frontier at roughly five hours of human-equivalent work at 50% success, doubling every seven months across the full 2019–2025 run and every three months since 2024.</p>

<p>That trajectory does not primarily make developers faster. It changes who can build software at all. Today, an analyst in finance who spots an inefficiency writes a proposal, quantifies ROI, and queues behind IT. Three years out, they build it themselves in an afternoon. The addressable automation set changes by an order of magnitude rather than a percentage — and it changes in every function at once, not just in engineering.</p>

<p>That is the thing to plan around.</p>

<h2 id="where-the-value-lands">Where the value lands</h2>

<p>Three areas, on cost and revenue optimisation. Growth is too industry-specific to generalise, so I leave it out.</p>

<p><strong>1. Time to market in product development.</strong> The least contentious place to start. Measure it as end-to-end lead time from decision to production, not as coding throughput. If coding is 20% of your cycle, a 10x on coding buys you 1.2x. Amdahl does not care how good the model is.</p>

<p><strong>2. Operational efficiency.</strong> The largest pool: automation of internal processes, AI assistance in knowledge work, agent-executed workflows, and service quality. This is where self-service either happens or does not.</p>

<p><strong>3. Decision quality.</strong> Risk, pricing, targeting, issue detection. Hardest to measure, longest to compound.</p>

<p>Put approximate magnitudes at the area level, not per team. Per-constituency percentage targets invite the honest answer: “that is unrealistic and I will not own it.”</p>

<h2 id="the-levers">The levers</h2>

<p><strong>Self-service.</strong> The proposal → business case → IT queue path is the real tax. Removing it is worth more than any model upgrade.</p>

<p><strong>Verification capacity.</strong> When generation is nearly free, the constraint moves to review, test and control. Almost nobody budgets for this. It is the bottleneck that arrives in year two.</p>

<p><strong>Platform, with data inside it.</strong> The platform’s job is to minimise the barrier to entry and usage. Data belongs in it, not beside it.</p>

<p><strong>Federated supply.</strong> Core platforms, product IT, engineering practice and tooling, data, AI components and model risk. Bundling these under a single CTO line is a planning error, not an org-chart preference.</p>

<p><strong>Change management, cross-cutting.</strong> Training, mindset, depth of adoption. It touches every constituency, which is exactly why it ends up orphaned.</p>

<h2 id="what-separates-the-6">What separates the 6%</h2>

<p>One variable does most of the work in that survey. Seventy-three percent of the high performers fundamentally redesigned workflows. About a quarter of everyone else did. Seats bought, licences deployed, adoption dashboards green — none of that discriminates. Redesign does.</p>

<p>Three things follow.</p>

<p><strong>Name an owner.</strong> Shared ownership of a workstream means nobody answers for underdelivery.</p>

<p><strong>Redesign one workflow before scaling seats.</strong> It is the cheapest way to find out whether your gain is absorbable at all.</p>

<p><strong>Watch the entry level.</strong> Stanford’s payroll data has workers aged 22–25 in the most AI-exposed occupations sitting about 19% below where they would be tracking their less-exposed peers, up from 15% a year earlier — with no comparable effect on experienced workers and no economy-wide displacement. The aggregate is quiet. The margin is not, and the margin moves first.</p>

<h2 id="what-this-blog-is">What this blog is</h2>

<p>Agentic journey is my working record of building products with Claude and Codex as a non-programmer: experiments, benchmarks and missteps, written up as they happen. It isn’t a how-to. Where the numbers come from someone else, they’re linked.</p>

<h2 id="sources">Sources</h2>

<ul>
  <li>McKinsey / QuantumBlack, <em>The State of AI 2026</em> (fielded May–June 2026, published 26 Aug 2026). <a href="https://www.techtimes.com/articles/325590/20260826/record-ai-spending-cant-move-earnings-needle-94-enterprises-mckinsey-finds.htm">Coverage</a></li>
  <li>METR, <a href="https://metr.org/blog/2026-1-29-time-horizon-1-1/">Time Horizon 1.1</a> (29 Jan 2026)</li>
  <li>Stanford Digital Economy Lab, <a href="https://digitaleconomy.stanford.edu/news/canariesaug26/">Canaries in the Coal Mine, August 2026 update</a></li>
</ul>]]></content><author><name></name></author><summary type="html"><![CDATA[Where AI coding value actually lands, and why most of it never reaches the P&L]]></summary></entry></feed>